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DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUPS AND THE
PRICE OF COST CONTAINMENT
In 1965, the Medicare program was authorized to pay part of the costs of
health care services for the elderly of this country.1 The program provided a
basic health insurance protection from the costs of inpatient hospital care.2
Originally, Medicare utilized a per diem method of reimbursement where
payments were based on usual, customary, and reasonable costs.3 Such cost-
based, retrospective reimbursement systems4 placed virtually no limitation
on the amount of costs to be reimbursed.5
Physicians and hospitals were guaranteed recovery of most of the money
spent, patients paid for only a small percentage of their total bills, and there
was no thought that the Medicare program would ever exhaust its supply of
money. 6 Accordingly, there were no demands for hospitals to control medi-
cal costs. In fact, by recovering almost all money expended, hospitals had
been encouraged to advance medical technology7 and expand the types of
services offered.' According to the United States Congress, Office of Tech-
nology Assessment, such advancements in new and existing technologies had
been responsible for a substantial portion of the rise in hospital costs.9 The
end result has been sky-rocketing health care costs that greatly surpassed
general inflation.1 0
Then in 1983, facing ever-rising medical costs that showed no indication
1. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Title XVIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1965).
2. Id., Part A, 42 U.S.C. § 426.
3. Medicare Program: Prospective Payments for Medicare Inpatient Hospital Services,
48 Fed. Reg. 39,752, 39,754 (1983) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 405, 409 and 489).
4. Other third party payers, such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield, employed reimbursement
methods similar to that of Medicare. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DIAGNOSIS RE-
LATED GROUPS (DRGs) AND THE MEDICARE PROGRAM: IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY-A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 3 (July 1983) [hereinafter cited as OTA
Report].
5. Shaffer, DRGs: History and Overview, 4 NURS. & HEALTHCARE 388, 389 (1983).
6. Id. at 388-389.
7. Medical technology refers to the "drugs, devices, and medical and surgical procedures
used in medical care, and the organizational and supportive systems within which such care is
provided. OTA Report, supra note 4, at ix.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Id.
10. Hospital costs have grown from $14 billion in 1965 to $118 billion in 1981. STAFF OF
SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., IST SESS., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
PROSPECTIVE REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEMS FOR FINANCING HOSPITAL CARE 98-108 (Comm.
Print 1983).
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of reversal, predicted exhaustion of the Medicare Trust Fund, and an enor-
mous federal deficit, Congress took drastic steps to decrease the outpouring
of government funds for hospital care." To limit the extent to which Medi-
care would reimburse hospitals, Congress changed the focus of the method
of payment.12 The new system is a prospective payment system where rates
are previously determined and assigned by specific diagnoses or Diagnosis
Related Groups (DRGs)."' DRGs is a classification system which groups
patients according to principal diagnosis, presence of a surgical procedure,
age, presence or absence of significant comorbidities or complications, and
other relevant criteria.' 4
This comment will explore the utility of the DRGs in light of the
problems inherent in a prospective payment system based exclusively on di-
agnosis categories. To provide the necessary foundation for a meaningful
discussion of DRGs, this comment first will explore the case mix and its role
in prospective payment systems. To promote a clearer understanding of the
DRG system, the history behind the DRGs will be briefly related before
explaining the mechanics of the system. Next, focus will shift to the
problems associated with the DRG system. Particular emphasis will be
placed on the system's impact on the role of the physician, the future of
medical technology, the quality of care that can be expected, and the hospi-
tal facility itself. Additionally, some available alternatives to the DRG ap-
proach will be examined. The final section will explore the future of health
care and will suggest a more suitable means of containing health care costs
while maintaining a level of adequate quality.
DIAGNOSIS RELATED GROUPS: INCENTIVES FOR EFFICIENCY
Attempting to curtail rising hospital costs and protect the solvency of the
Medicare program, the United States Congress changed the focus of the re-
imbursement method to a prospective rate-setting system. By legislating this
dramatic change, Congress forced hospitals to accept responsibility for any
over-utilization of their services." Instead of covering the costs incurred
and thus promoting the escalation of hospital costs, 16 a prospective payment
system encourages cost containment.' 7 Because hospitals receive incentive
11. Felch, DRGs: Why, When, Where, Who and How, 24 INTERNIST 7 (1983).
12. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww.
13. Id.
14. OTA Report, supra note 4, at ix.
15. Davis, A Bold Step Forward, 24 INTERNIST 8 (1983).
16. Per diem billing tends to encourage longer lengths of stay in hospitals. Shaffer, supra
note 5, at 389.
17. Id. at 393.
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payments when a patient's length of stay is shorter than average, they benefit
from a prospective rate-setting system.' 8 Conversely, hospitals must absorb
the loss when costs exceed the standard. 9 Thus, a prospective payment sys-
tem provides incentives for efficiency and disincentives for waste.2"
A prospective rate-setting system2 requires accurate instruments to mea-
sure the level of productivity and effectiveness in the hospital setting.2 2
When measuring reasonable hospital efficiency, the "case mix" lies at the
heart of determining hospital costs.2 3 A hospital's case mix is the "relative
frequency of admissions of various types of patients, reflecting different
needs for hospital resources."" "Differences or lack of differences in hospi-
tal costs . . . can be the result of different case mix compositions and may
not reflect differences in hospital productivity. " 25
The case mix measure is a valuable tool in analyzing hospital costs. Spe-
cifically, these measures can separate hospital expenditures attributable to
changes in the type of patients treated from those expenses incurred as a
result of changes in practice patterns for an unchanged mix of patients.2 6
Case mix measures also can be used to justify or evaluate capital expenditure
programs in terms of patient treatment patterns and resulting operating
costs. 27 Moreover, third party payers find case mix measures useful in ad-
justing limits on payments to reflect differences between a hospital and the
group with which it is being compared.2 8
In the search for the most useful case mix measure, several methods were
considered both individually and in conjunction with other methods.29 One
popular method of case mix measurement is the grouping of individual pa-
tients into illness or diagnostic categories. 30 Another method differentiates
between the uncomplicated and the more severe cases.3 ' A third method
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 396.
21. A prospective rate-setting system is a "hospital payment program where rates are set
prior to the period during which they apply and where the hospital incurs at least some fi-
anancial risk." OTA Report, supra note 4, at x.
22. Shaffer, supra note 5 (citing Fetter, Shin, Freeman, Averill & Thompson, Case Mix
Definition by Diagnosis Related Groups, 18 MEDICAL CARE 1 (1980).
23. Id.
24. OTA Report, supra note 4, at x.
25. Shaffer, supra note 5, at 390.
26. Bentley & Butler, Measurement of Case Mix, 8 Topics HEALTHCARE FIN. 1 (1982).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id. at 2-3.
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classifies individual patients' personal characteristics 32 that may affect treat-
ment patterns.3 A measure utilizing all the available data probably would
be far too numerous to be functional. a4 Consequently, a method was sought
that was not only useful and helpful but also administrable for its intended
application.35 DRGs emerged as one method capable of providing a useful
measurement of case mix that is also manageable in numbers. a6
History of the DRG
The Yale University Center for Health Studies and the Yale-New Haven
Hospital initially developed DRGs during the mid- 1970s.a The researchers
concentrated on defining expected lengths of patient stays for quality of care
studies and utilization review activities.3a In constructing the DRGs, the
focus was on defining case types, each of which was expected to require simi-
lar amounts of hospital services. 39 Hospital services were measured in terms
of the length of the hospital stay.' ° The Yale study reflected the dramatic
changes that were occurring in New Jersey hospital rate-setting at that time.
In 1971, the Health Facilities Planning Act provided the Commissioner of
Health with broad discretion to protect consumers from unreasonable hospi-
tal accounting practices.41 A 1974 consumer report cited that the per diem
method of hospital reimbursement encouraged hospitals to extend the
lengths of inpatient stays beyond that which was medically required.42 The
report went on to suggest that hospital reimbursement by the case would
tend to discourage the over-utilization of hospital services.43 Utilizing the
Yale study, developers based the DRGs on the length of hospital stays, fully
realizing that length of stay "may not be as accurate an indicator of the level
of output as actual costs."' " Researchers justified the use of the DRG sys-
tem by reason of its availability. 45 The original system of 383 categories was
32. Characteristics such as age, sex, or even income arrangements are thought to be legiti-
mate influences on medical care patterns. Id. at 3.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Lynch, A DRG Primer, 47 CONN. MED. 552, 552-53 (1983).
37. Id. at 552.
38. Caterinicchio & Warren, DRGs and Medical Practice.: Meeting the Challenge of In-
centive Reimbursement, 79 J. MED. Soc'v N.J. 895, 896 (1982).
39. Id
40. Id.; see also Shaffer, supra note 5, at 391.
41. Shaffer, supra note 5, at 389.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 390.
44. Id. at 391.
45. Id.
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later expanded to include 467 categories." The expansion was justified be-
cause there were excessive numbers of "outliers" or patients who did not fit
within any of the categories.4 7
The DRG system was chosen over alternative methods because it "con-
fronted the practical necessity of employing length of stay as the indicator of
cost for the statistical creation of the diagnostic categories. ' 4' The DRG
method of payment was attractive for several reasons. DRGs attempt to
define hospital services as products and patients as consumers.4 9 The DRG
classification is based upon data usually included in the discharge abstract
that is compiled for each patient.5" The system is manageable in numbers
with only 467 groups.5 Also appealing was that DRGs are organized in a
hierarchical manner. If fewer categories are required, terminal diagnosis
groups can be combined into fewer categories that are still useful.52 DRGs
are clinically coherent in that a physician could identify a treatment pattern
by the patient's DRG.
5 3
The DRG system is not without its disadvantages. DRGs rely on patient
discharge abstracts which are all too susceptible of coding and classification
errors.5 4 DRGs are not all-inclusive; some diagnoses and procedures are not
considered.55 Moreover, DRGs reflect the state of medical technology and
practice at the time of their development.5 6 This necessitates the reformula-
tion of DRGs to reflect any advancements in diagnostic procedures and
treatment modalities.57 Especially true with respect to the original 383 cate-
gories, but just as important now, is that the performance of a surgical pro-
cedure often categorizes a patient into a more complex DRG. 8 The
potential exists for surgical procedures to be encouraged because they result
in higher reimbursement.5 9 DRGs are employed to categorize only inpa-
tients. 6' Because DRGs group patients into homogeneous categories based
on length of stay, the system is neither a standard for medical procedures
46. Id. at 394-395.
47. Id. at 394.
48. Id. at 392.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 393.
51. See Lynch, supra note 36, at 552.
52. See Shaffer, supra note 5, at 393.
53. See Lynch, supra note 36, at 553.
54. See Shaffer, supra note 5, at 393.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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nor a measure of quality of care. 6
The New Jersey plan formed the basis for the national model. The federal
system incorporated those elements of the New Jersey system that were
thought to be easily administrable on a national level.62 The cost data from
past years were used to develop the fixed rate per DRG.63 Contrary to the
New Jersey plan, the federal system does not apply to all third party payers,
.but only to Medicare." Another notable difference is that the national
DRG system will be adjusted for rural and urban hospitals through the use
of nine census regions. 6'
Although the motivation behind the original development of the DRG
was unrelated to its use in hospital payment systems, state and federal gov-
ernments considered it to be ready for implementation at a time when all
were concerned about uncontrollable hospital costs. This concern was so
great that the DRG system was adopted even though it was never ade-
quately evaluated as indicative of patient resource needs nor for possible im-
pact on medical technology.66
Assignment of a DRG
Upon discharge from a hospital, a Medicare beneficiary is assigned one
and only one DRG, regardless of the actual number of ailments.67 Where
the patient was in the hospital for more than one illness, his or her medical
record abstract, as prepared by the attending physician, must be run through
a computer program (the Grouper).6" The Grouper then assigns the patient
to a Major Diagnostic Category (MDC) based on the principal diagnosis, the
rest of the diagnoses, the procedures, the discharge status, and the patient's
age.69 The Grouper verifies the accuracy and, if the MDC does not coincide
with all the data, it assigns an error code and processing is terminated.70
Once the MDC is assigned, its own decision tree is applied.7' Using the
information on the discharge abstract, the Grouper follows a unique branch
of the tree to determine the final DRG.72 The decision tree is a maze leading
61. Id. at 394.
62. Id. at 395.
63. Id.
64. Id
65. Id.
66. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 57.
67. See Lynch, supra note 36, at 552.
68. Id. at 554.
69. Id
70. Id. at 554-55.
71. Id. at 555.
72. Id
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from the MDC to specific DRGs and is founded on several principles.7 3
Other than the principal diagnosis, no significance is given to the ordering of
other diagnoses and surgical information.74 Initial partitions of the medical
or surgical patients are usually based on clinically coherent groups of proce-
dures.7 5 To keep each DRG mutually exclusive, each operating room proce-
dure category was ranked in a hierarchy of resource intensity.7 6 Partitions
based on surgical procedure and principal diagnoses are usually completed
before the use of other variables."" Partitions are as homogeneous in terms
of resource consumption as possible.7" Notably, system variables (such as
discharge to a nursing home or payment source) are not direct patient attrib-
utes and as such are not used to define DRGs.79
Obviously, timely and accurate documentation and coding of the patient's
medical chart are absolutely crucial to the DRG system.8 0 As a result, med-
ical records personnel must learn the language of DRGs.s1 Guidelines must
be developed to address coding problems.8 2 Seminars are needed to educate
physicians about the codes and their meanings for DRG asssignment . 3
Another problem involved in the assignment of DRGs is that of the outli-
ers. Outliers are patients whose ailments cannot be categorized within one
DRG.84 This group also accounts for those patients who, although assigned
a DRG, have such complications as to require an excess length of stay, but
not to the extent that a different DRG would apply.8 5 Under the New Jerssy
Plan, outliers accounted for over thirty percent of the total costs of twelve of
the fifty-five hospitals.8 6 Although the original DRGs have been expanded
to include more categories, outliers are still expected to account for a sub-
stantial percentage of total costs.8 7 It is important that outliers not be dis-
missed as just cases of extremely high or low consumption; hospital
management should examine the documentation for possible missing or im-
73. J. GRIMALDI, DRGs: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 224 (1984).
74. See Lynch, supra note 36, at 555-56.
75. Id. at 556.
76. Id
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. GRIMALDI, supra note 73, at 215.
81. Id. at 216.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 216-17.
84. See Lynch, supra note 36, at 557.
85. Id.
86. GRIMALDI, supra note 73, at 217.
87. Id.
19861
312 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 2:305
proper coding.8
8
Application and Implementation of the DRGs
In October of 1983, the DRG prospective payment system began its three-
year "phase-in" period.89 By the end of 1986, there will be a national rural
and a national urban rate.' Adjustments will be made for differences in
hospital wage levels compared to the national average hospital wage. 91
The, prospective payment will apply to all non-physician inpatient care
and will be viewed as payment in full.92 Hospitals will not be permitted to
bill Medicare patients any supplemental charges for covered services.93
Most acute-care, short-term, non-federal hospitals that serve Medicare
beneficiaries throughout the fifty states and the District of Columbia will be
covered by the program.94 Those hospitals exempt from the system include
psychiatric, long-term, children's and rehabilitation hospitals which will
continue to be reimbursed on the basis of cost.95 Exceptions and adjust-
ments may be made for hospitals that are sole community providers, public
hospitals, teaching hospitals, some research hospitals, and others that serve a
disproportionately large number of low-income or Medicare beneficiaries. 96
There is some indication that "imposition of a DRG-based reimbursement
scheme requires additional administrative resources."'97 The precise magni-
tude of the additional resources is not readily discernable from preliminary
analysis.9" Cost increases will vary among hospitals as a result of different
procedures. Proponents of the system hope that increased administrative
burdens would be offset by the cost saving attributes of the prospective pay-
ment system.99
However, findings indicate that the DRG variable did not perform sub-
stantially better than other variables."° This raises a question regarding the
cost-effectiveness of using DRGs to reflect a case mix.' °  Moreover, results
of the studies also suggest that no case mix variable helped to explain more
88. See Lynch, supra note 36, at 557.
89. See Davis, supra note 15, at 8.
90. Id
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 9.
95. Id
96. Id.
97. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 53-54.
98. Id. at 54.
99. I
100. GRIMALDI, supra note 73, at 199.
101. Id
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than seventy percent of the variation in cost.' °2 Additionally, other classifi-
cation schemes may be as effective as the original DRGs in grouping patients
homogeneously.'o 3 Therefore, utilization of any of the alternative methods
available "would result in about the same payments to hospitals as in a pro-
spective reimbursement scheme."' 4
LIMITATIONS OF THE DRG SYSTEM
.The Physician's Role
The DRG-based system of prospective payment will undoubtedly alter the
role of the physician within the health care industry. Traditionally, physi-
cians controlled the process of medicine and made the decisions regarding
the provision of health care."' Through the implementation of the DRG
system, the physician will hold a prominent role in determining the profit or
loss of the hospital.' 6 Conversely, the success of the physician depends on
the success of his or her hospital.0 7 The ultimate success of the program
appears to rest on the idealistic goal of symbiotic cooperation of physicians,
nurses, financial officers, medical records staff, and billing personnel.'0 8
DRG reimbursement will require physicians to attend more to adminis-
trative detail and clerical tasks." .Because reimbursement is contingent on
diagnoses and surgical procedures, it is imperative that doctors complete
their charts in a timely and accurate manner." 0 Delayed charts and errone-
ous documentation can result in cash flow problems and improper reim-
bursement."' To ensure proper recordkeeping, hospitals may give medical
record coders the authority to change the principal diagnosis as reported by
the physician." 2 Hence, education programs are needed so the physician
can become familiar with the required documentation and identify essential
differences between these new requirements and customary clinical presenta-
tions." 3 Payment rates may be used as a guideline in situations where the
principal diagnosis is unclear and the patient has several diagnoses that
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Bloom, Prospective Payment to Alter the Relationship Between MDs and Hospitals, 12
Hosp. MED. STAFF 21, 22 (1983).
106. Id at 21.
107. Elwood, When MDs Meet DRGs, 57 Hose. 62, 64 (1983).
108. Id.; see also GRIMALDI, supra note 73.
109. GRIMALDI, supra note 73, at 146.
110. Id.
111. Id
112. Id. at 147.
113. Id
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could have caused a hospital admission."
14
The inflation factor of the system contains a salary component." 5 This
provision sets a ceiling on the reimbursable wage increase that can be given
to hospital employees." 6 The inflation factor does not apply to fees that
physicians charge for services rendered to specific patients."" The limit
does apply to all physicians whose services are a cost to the hospital, i.e.,
those who are paid a salary or fee by the hospital to provide patient care."'
When juxtaposed with the goal of minimizing interdepartmental cross-subsi-
dization, the limits may reduce physician income below existing levels." 9
This can be seen clearly where physicians are paid a percentage of gross
departmental charges. In an attempt to avoid possible income controls, hos-
pital-based physicians may wish to begin billing patients separately for serv-
ices rendered. 20 The administrator of the Health Care Financing
Administration contends that physicians' fees will eventually join hospital
rates under the DRG system.' 21
Frequently, doctors have been accused of inducing escalating hospital
costs because of their failure to practice cost-effective medicine.' 22 Although
cost-effective medical techniques have rarely been explored and reported,
DRG-based data may provide necessary information for meaningful effi-
ciency research.123 DRG-based data may also provide information concern-
ing which doctors are cost-efficient and which are not. 121 Of course, many
financial managers and medical directors already know which physicians are
high-cost doctors. 2' However, the DRG information may provide the doc-
umentation needed to discuss the problem constructively.'
26
DRG information can serve as the basis for reports that reflect the profits
or losses generated by each physician. 127 Because the rates were determined
as the average cost, it is unreasonable to expect doctors to generate a profit
for each patient. 128 The importance of these reports lies in the profit-loss
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id
119. Id
120. Id at 148.
121. Davis, supra note 15, at 8.
122. GRIMALDI, supra note 73, at 148.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 150.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 152.
128. Id.
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balance.' 2 9 If losses are repeatedly confined to certain DRGs, the hospital
may be forced to curtail those services. 130
The constant struggle to maintain high quality patient care without oper-
ating at a loss is almost guaranteed to spark head-on confrontations between
physicians and hospital administrators.1 3' Hospitals will be scrutinizing
physicians' practices more closely than ever. More and more, doctors will
be pressured to vary or modify practices to guard against a loss.' 32 This
could tempt some doctors to change a diagnosis in order to obtain greater
reimbursement. It is likely that pressure will be exerted for a physician to
curtail services that have little bearing on patient outcome, but are merely
used for the sake of completeness or under the rubric of defensive
medicine.' 33 Physicians will also be urged to do more preadmission testing
and take fewer tests during a hospital stay.' 34 In an effort to raise revenues,
hospitals are likely to pressure physicians to admit those "low-cost" people
who could be treated as outpatients. 35 These "marginal admissions" are
patients who do not require long stays or lots of tests and will hold down
costs to the hospital without changing the DRG reimbursement.
36
Similarly, doctors may feel pressured to utilize "DRG creep" and "patient
ping-pong." DRG creep is the term given to the practice of assigning the
DRG category with the highest possible reimbursement; this is especially
true with Medicare patients who often have multiple ailments. 37 Patient
ping-pong refers to the discharge and immediate readmission of patients who
have multiple diagnoses or need more than one surgical procedure.' 3s Pa-
tient ping-pong can also occur by moving the patient to a service of the
hospital not covered by the DRG system (such as the psychiatric ward) and
then back to the DRG regulated room.139
Doctors may be pressured to discharge patients sooner than normally rec-
ommended or medically sound.' 40 Senator Durenberger warns that physi-
cians who continually lose money for the hospital may find themselves
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Bloom, supra note 105, at 23.
132. Id.
133. Hunt, DRG - "hat it is, How it Works, and Why it Will Hurt, 60 MED. ECON. 262,
265 (1983).
134. Id. at 266.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Bloom, supra note 105, at 22.
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denied staff privileges. 4 ' Moreover, hospitals may attempt to reduce their
professional staffs by replacing high-cost physicians with low-cost
professionals. 4
2
Medical Technology
The role of the physician will not be the only area of health care to suffer
under the DRG prospective payment system. Existing technologies, techno-
logical modifications and improvements, and future technologies will be af-
fected adversely. Congress originated a Prospective Payment Assessment
Commission in October of 1983, in a feeble attempt to safeguard medical
technology. 43 The purpose of the Commission is to examine the current
state of modern medical technology.'" But according to its deputy director,
the Commission has been unable to keep abreast of the new technologies. 45
Because the DRG system encourages the disuse of services not absolutely
necessary, many hospitals may find themselves forced to relinquish certain
services and equipment.' 46 Because different hospitals have varying case
mixes, the technologies each can utilize under the DRG system will be lim-
ited to those that are cost-saving and used with at least some degree of fre-
quency.141 Unable to pay for expensive equipment used by only a few
patients, hospitals will be forced to discontinue the service. 148 Expenditures
on new technologies are not automatically reimbursed under the DRG sys-
tem; therefore, technology will be competing with alternative uses for funds
(including employee wages).' 49 Patients in need of certain technological
services will be forced to travel to a hospital with a patient population large
enough to allow indulgences of existing medical technologies. Gone are the
days of a CAT scan in every hospital.
The DRG system also discourages technological modifications and ad-
vancements. In fact, today there exists medical technology that, although
practiced regularly, has no DRG category.' 50 For example, intraocular lens
implantation is an operation that replaces the lens of the eye in cataract
141. Id.
142. Id. at 23.
143. See Hobbs, Worse than the Disease? Cost Controls Pose a Mounting Threat to U.S.
Health Care, Barron's, Feb. 11, 1985, at 9.
144. Id.
145. Id
146. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 26.
147. Id. at 40.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 41.
150. See Hobbs, supra note 143, at 9.
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victims."'5 The operation is being performed with increasing frequency
although it is quite expensive.'5 2 The problem lies in its DRG placement.
The DRG reflects the diagnosis, cataracts, and not the treatment. The DRG
assigned for cataracts is based on the procedures employed in 1981 which
may be somewhat outdated. The same problem arises with pacemaker im-
plantations.153 Although reaching proportions of almost routine practice, in
1981 such an operation was practically nonexistent.154
Similarly, the DRG for leukemia which was established in 1981 assumes
that it is a fatal disease.' 5 However, a new technique involving bone mar-
row transplantation makes it possible to save some leukemia patients. 156
Although the cost of this procedure varies regionally, it is guaranteed to soar
into the tens of thousands of dollars in the future.157
Existing techniques are not the only procedures to be hampered by the
DRG system.' The Commission has expressed concern that the DRGs
may inhibit the use of the litho-tripter.'5 9 The litho-tripter is a new device
that crushes kidney stones without the use of surgery."W Without the poten-
tial for use of new devices that prove successful, any incentive to invent more
devices is gone.
The deputy director of the Commission has stated that the DRGs will
always be struggling to attain the level of medical technology. 16' Even
though the first updating of the DRGs to include new technologies is ex-
pected early next year, it is very likely to be outdated even before its comple-
tion. 162 Yet, too frequent creation of new technologically-specific DRGs
could undermine the very incentives of per case payment. 63
Quality of Care
The DRG system's primary goal is cost control. Consequently, quality
will become an increasingly critical issue. Using an arbitrary category for
the average case produces a tendency for physicians and their facilities to
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 41.
159. See Hobbs, supra note 143, at 9.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. OTA Report, supra note 4, at 58.
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reduce unnecessary services. But the distinction between necessary and un-
necessary is seldom clearly defined. Moreover, with so many subjective fac-
tors involved in the quality of care, it is natural that payers, providers, and
consumers will perceive quality differently.
Traditionally, hospitals, intermediaries, and Professional Standards Re-
view Organizations (PSROs) shared responsibility for quality assurance and
utilization review.'" Congress established the PSRO program in 1972 with
the dual objectives of quality assurance and cost containment.' 65 In 1982,
Congress replaced the PSROs with Utilization and Quality Control Peer Re-
view Organizations (PROs). 161 Under the DRG system, hospitals will have
to make arrangements with PROs for review of the quality of care and the
appropriateness of admissions and readmissions. 167 Historically, the balance
between quality of care and cost containment was never really reached; the
emphasis always went toward cost containment.1 68 At this time, it is un-
known whether the PROs can strike an appropriate balance where the
PSROs failed. 169
However, this is not to suggest that the quality of care under the DRG
system must go unchecked. There are several techniques designed to assess
the quality of health care within the hospital. Admission certification is a
method of review whereby a patient is determined to have been properly
admitted as an inpatient. 170 The certification is performed within the first
twenty-four hours of admission. 71 Throughout a hospital stay, a patient's
health is reevaluated, focusing on the severity of the illness and
dischargeability. 1
72
Because documentation is so vital to the DRG system and because studies
show that from twenty-five to forty percent of the documented information
is in error, there is a need for random review of records as well as guidelines
to assist in recording the data.' 73 Ancillary review would evaluate whether
hospital services were provided in a cost-effective manner. 74  Hospitals
might also provide discharge planning procedures to facilitate the discharge
164. Id. at 34.
165. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b) 86 Stat, 1429,
1430 (1972) (amended 1982).
166. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. 1320c (1982).
167. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 34.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Thompson, Diagnosis Related Groups and Quality Assurance, 8 ToPics HEALTrHCARE
FIN. 43, 45 (1982).
171. Id.
172. Id
173. Id. at 46.
174. Id.
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of patients in the most efficient manner. 175 Through data collected by the
PROs, profiles of individual physicians or institutional performance by
DRG can be monitored and sanctions can be placed on those providing in-
adequate care. 176
It must be remembered that the DRG system is a system of cost control.
It is the responsibility of the administrator and the physician to educate and
persuade the government as to the minimum acceptable quality of care.
Hospital Facility
The impact of the DRG system on the hospital facility will be dramatic
and possibly long-lasting. One positive influence the DRGs will have on
hospitals is that hospital recordkeeping procedures and performances must
necessarily improve if a hospital expects to curb losses. 177 In an attempt to
keep costs down, hospitals may try to keep many people out or shorten their
stays.'17  Some hospitals will be establishing ambulatory care centers that
will promote the use of less invasive technology. 79 In fact, Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Michigan now offers monetary incentives to surgeons who do
certain minor operations on an outpatient, same-day basis.'80 The Personal
Care Residence of Presbyterian Medical Center in Philadelphia is an innova-
tive concept that offers hospital care in a hotel setting at approximately one-
fifth the price.18 ' The purpose of such places is to give patients who are not
quite ready to go home a supervised place to stay, without having to pay for
services they do not really need.'8 2 In determining how far to go, the hospi-
tals' obligation to all present and potential patients must be weighed against
their obligation to provide "charitable care" in a particular instance.'8 3
Rather than evolving with the hospitals, some physicians have decided to
compete with the institutions. Emergency care centers are being established
with greater frequency.' 8 4 Such centers are usually found in easily accessible
and highly visible locations. The centers provide treatments normally asso-
ciated with a hospital dispensary.
175. Id. at 46-47.
176. Id. at 47; Medicare DRGs: Challenges for Quality Care: Hearing Before the Senate
Special Committee on Aging, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (Sept. 26, 1985) (unpublished hearing).
177. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 51.
178. Prevention, Feb. 11, 1985, at 127.
179. Bloom, supra note 105, at 22.
180. Prevention, supra note 178, at 127.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. May, The Dr., The Patient, & The DRG, 13 HASTINGS CENT. REP. 23 (1983).
184. Id.
1986]
320 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 2:305
Also popular are the Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). 8
HMOs consist of several physicians who provide health care at rates lower
than hospitals. Typically, HMOs offer a full range of medical services to
anyone who pays a flat fee. Therefore, if hospitals do not address the
problems of prospective payment plans and cooperate to lower health costs,
the facilities may find themselves in financial ruin. Hospitals must work
with their medical staffs if they expect to survive the competition.
ALTERNATIVES TO THE DRGs: CHANGING THE Focus
OF MEDICAL PAYMENTS
The DRG prospective payment system can be viewed as merely the first
step toward high-quality and low-cost hospital care. In authorizing the
DRG classification scheme, Congress allowed for the use of alternative
methods. 186 Individual states are not precluded from designing their own
systems, 187 provided the methods control hospital costs at least as well as the
Medicare system."88 Hence, it is important to examine the available alterna-
tive approaches to case mix measurement.
ICD-9CM List A
The ICD-9CM List A contains 398 diagnosis groups that are subdivided
into case types or cells.' 89 Each cell is based on five age variables, dichoto-
mies for operated or not operated, and single diagnosis or multiple diagno-
ses."9° The end result is 7,960 case types or cells. 9 ' The most obvious
limitation of List A is that the number of case types is too large. Conse-
quently, many cells contain an insignificant number of patients.' 92
Other limitations that are not quite so glaring, although more important,
include the equal treatment given to secondary diagnoses and the omission
185. Angrist, Now the Doctors Wait For Him, Forbes, Sept. 24, 1984, at 124.
186. See OTA Report, supra note 4 at 59.
187. E.g., In 1981, Arizona embellished its prospective payment system with such concepts
as price competition for contracts to serve the system beneficiaries, case management to au-
thorize access to additional services, and an expanded system to cover state employees. STAFF
OF SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., IST SESS., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN PROSPECTIVE REIMBURSEMENT SYSTEMS FOR FINANCING HOSPITAL CARE 98-108
(Comm. Print 1983).
188. States that have been successful in reducing the growth rate of hospital costs between
1976 and 1980 include Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Wash-
ington and Wisconsin. Id. at 1.
189. Plomann & Shaffer, DRGs as One of Nine Approaches to Case Mix in Transition, 4
NURS. & HEALTHCARE 438, 439 (1983).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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of specific surgical procedures.' 93 Clinically, not all secondary diagnoses
will have the same effect on a patient's level of illness, but List A gives all
secondary diagnoses equal weight. List A segregates patients on the basis of
operated or not operated; however, whether the surgical procedure is major
or minor may affect a patient's use of hospital resources.' 9 4 While the
number of case types in ICD-9CM List A is awkward, it addresses some of
the criticisms of the DRG system involving the different approaches toward
the refinement of variations within the same diagnostic category.' 9 In fu-
ture versions of the case mix classifications, some of the 7,960 types set forth
in ICD-9CM List A may be incorporated in them.
Disease Staging
In 1748, John Fothergill first staged diseases to develop homogeneous pa-
tient groups. 196 The National Institutes of Health (NIH) then adopted the
staging concept for use in cancer research.' 9 7 Explicit definitions of each
stage of an illness formed the basis for the Disease Staging approach to case
mix measurement.' 9
Disease staging is the "specification of progressive levels of severity for
disease in terms of the events and pathophysiological observations that char-
acterize each stage."' 99 A given disease is categorized into five primary
stages or levels of severity.2 " Stage 0 involves conditions where no disease
is present or the diagnosis is unknown.2"' Stage I is for conditions without
complications or problems of minimal severity.20 2 Stage II is for conditions
with local complications or problems of moderate severity.20 3 Stage III in-
volves conditions with systemic complications or problems of a serious na-
ture.2". Stage IV is reserved for death. 20 5 The stages are based on
physicians' judgments of the progression of conditions through levels of
severity.2 ° 6
Disease staging is a desirable method of case mix measurement because
193. Id
194. Id
195. Id.
196. Id. at 441.
197. Id
198. Id.
199. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 16.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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the criteria are easily understood and accepted by physicians based on their
clinical meaningfulness.2 °7 The staging also adds an explicit severity dimen-
sion to the classification scheme the lack of which has been a criticism of the
DRG system.2 °8 Another attractive feature of the disease staging system is
that the information required is usually available on the discharge
abstract.209
Yet, disease staging is not without its disadvantages. Certain diseases can-
not be staged.210 No actual statistical measures of resource consumption are
utilized in categorizing patients.21 ' Disease staging also ignores concurrent
conditions and patient-related variables which affect resource
consumption.21 2
Disease staging may prove very useful in the refinement needed within the
diagnostic groups of the DRG system. By blending the advantages of both
systems, a new and possibly better case mix measure may be created.
Patient Management Categories
Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania 213 introduced a Patient Management
Category (PMC) approach to case mix measurement which goes beyond the
DRG system. Instead of measuring case mix by diagnosis at the time of
discharge as done by DRGs, PMC also examines the reason for hospital
admission. 2 4 The underlying theory states that the reason for admission as
well as the ultimate diagnosis will affect the length of stay, the resource con-
sumption, and the total cost.
215
Comparing PMCs with other case mix measures, similarities and differ-
ences can be seen. As with other measures, PMCs were developed with ini-
tial physician involvement.21 6 Levels of severity are considered from a
clinical perspective.2 17 Unlike other systems, however, PMCs focus on the
patient's clinical characteristics. 218 Rather than examining how the patient
should be treated, PMCs look to the services, the procedures, and the ex-
207. Plomann & Shaffer, supra note 189, at 441.
208. Id.
209. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 17.
210. Id
211. Id.; Plomann & Shaffer, supra note 189, at 441.
212. E.g.. age, family support, overall health status; See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 17;
Plomann & Shaffer, supra note 189, at 441.
213. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 18; Plomann & Shaffer, supra note 189, at 441.
214. See sources cited in note 213.
215. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 18.
216. Id.; Plomann & Shaffer, supra note 189, at 441.
217. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 18.
218. Id.
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pected length of stay the physician believes is required in treating the pa-
tient.2" 9 Such "patient management paths" provide a foundation for
determining relative cost for each PMC.22 °
The PMC method is attractive because it considers both payment and pa-
tient management in the development process.221 The key to this system is
its "recognition that patient managment should be the focus of any system
that seeks to encourage efficiency and the deliberate attempt on the part of
the developers to produce a system that would simultaneously be meaningful
to physicians and facilitate efficiency improvements in the management of
patient care.",
2 22
VA Multilevel Care Groups
The Veterans Administration Department of Medicine and Surgery Mul-
tilevel Care System (MLC) was developed in 1976.223 It was based on the
concept of progressive patient care that was utilized in the United States and
Europe twenty years earlier. 22 4 This system determines the real cost of re-
sources consumed at a given level.225 The different levels of care are deter-
mined by the health resource needs of patients, grouping together those with
similar needs. 22 6 The average resource consumption at each level is tabu-
lated to arrive at an actual resource cost.
2 2 7
The MLC system measures case mix not by the length of stay but rather
by the relative intensity of the resources required.228 Because the MLC sys-
tem employs only four categories, it necessarily follows that patients within a
category are not medically homogeneous.22 9 The system measures the inten-
sity or amount of resources used within each level and is not dependent on
the diagnosis per se.2 30
The accuracy of a system that measures resource use could surpass that of
systems based on length of stay for any given diagnosis. 23' For instance, the
MLC system considers nursing care as a resource and permits cost alloca-
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Plomann & Shaffer, supra note 189, at 441.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id at 442.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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tion.232 DRGs, on the other hand, include all nursing care as part of hospi-
tal overhead.233
Severity of Illness Index
The Severity of Illness Index was based on the AS-SCORE classification
system.234 The AS-SCORE method classified patients into four levels of se-
verity based on clinical data documented in the patient's medical record at
the time of discharge.235 The AS-SCORE method was then modified to in-
clude a severity index.236 237
The severity index reflects the seriousness of the patient's overall illness
and not merely the patient's attributes that are deemed to be indicative of
overall illness severity. 238 Data obtained from a patient's medical record is
manually abstracted to arrive at an overall severity rating. 239
A large disadvantage of this system is its reliance on an individual "rater"
to manually abstract data from a medical record and then to detemine the
rate to be applied.2" Relying on this method of accounting would be expen-
sive and its subjective nature tends to discredit its reliability.241
MD-DADO
Resulting from an exploration of research methods of case mix groupings,
the Physician Discharge Abstract Data Optimal (MD-DADO) system at-
tempts to refine the 383 original diagnosis groups.242 The refinement con-
sists of using the charge per case as the dependent variable as well as
utilizing systematic physician input.243
The MD-DADO system analyzes hospital admissions rather than provid-
ing a fixed, universal classification. 21 MD-DADO allows for adjustment of
the groups to reflect factors peculiar to a given hospital, such as a physician's
232. Id
233. Id
234. Id
235. Id
236. Id.
237. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 17.
238. The criteria include: (1) the stage of the principal diagnosis; (2) its complications; (3)
additional conditions that affect hospital treatment; (4) required use of hospital staff; (5) extent
of nonoperating room procedures; (6) rate of recovery or response to therapy; and (7) level of
impairment remaining after therapy. Id.
239. Id.; Plomann & Shaffer, supra note 189, at 442.
240. See OTA Report, supra note 4, at 17.
241. Id.
242. Plomann & Shaffer, supra note 189, at 442.
243. Id
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preferences and types of disease characteristics of a specific patient
population.245
MD-DADO has refined many of the problems associated with the present
DRG system. Recognizing the objections that the users of the current sys-
tem have raised concerning the DRG applications among varying health
care management approaches, the MD-DADO system utilizes systematic
physician input.246
Generic Algorithms
Generic algorithms were developed at the Rockburn Institute in 1979-
1980.247 The creators attempted to design a classification system that groups
patients into categories that are not only medically meaningful, but also ho-
mogeneous with respect to charges.2 4' Bertram and Schumacher searched
for medically logical algorithms to group patients in order to analyze re-
source consumption.249 They wanted the system to be practical and func-
tional, utilizing available discharge abstract information to its maximum
potential.25 °
The generic algorithm approach has several factors in its favor. First, the
data utilized is taken from available information found within the discharge
abstract.25 1 Next, it includes all diagnostic and procedural codes that could
appear on a discharge abstract.2 52 Generic algorithms are flexible in that
patient groups are formed by variables reflecting patient population.25 3
However, the algorithms do not account for interplay between diagnosis and
procedure.25 4 Secondary diagnoses are weighed equally regardless of their
actual effect. 255
CONCLUSION
The goal of containing sky-rocketing health care costs is admirable. Few
would disagree that the cost of medical care has been far too high for far too
long with no foreseeable end. The development of a prospective DRG pay-
ment system for Medicare patients was a noble attempt to begin solving the
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 443.
248. lId
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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problems associated with the financing of hospital care. At the time of their
adoption, DRGs were the best case mix indicators that were sufficiently sta-
ble for immediate use. As such, Congress adopted them with little thought
to their adverse effects.
The DRG system was a fine beginning in moving toward low-cost, high-
quality medical care. If nothing else, DRGs forced physicians and hospitals
to realize that a problem exists. However, alternative methods exist today
that show equal or greater promise. The potential useful approaches to pro-
spective payment and per case payment are numerous. Fortunately, individ-
ual states are not discouraged from establishing an alternative payment
system. In using alternative methods, states can experiment with different
payment system configurations, including the use of other case mix measures
not yet available.
A payment environment must be created that uniformly and consistently
rewards hospitals for good business practices, yet does not inhibit technical
growth or compromise the quality of care received. Unless such a payment
environment is created, the intended long-term solutions may be impossible
to achieve.
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